000			01619nam a2200181Ia 4500
005			20260302161942.0
008			260302s9999 xx 000 0 und d
020			_a9780521441964
082			_a339.5 _bCUR
100			_aCurrie, David A.
245		0	_aRules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination / _cCurrie, David A.; Levine, Paul
260			_bCambridge University Press, _c1993
300			_a441 pages
520			_aIn this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active stabilisation policies in both a single- and multi-country context. Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules, policy design in the face of uncertainty and international policy coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of credibility and the effect of a policy-maker's reputation for sticking to announced policies. These considerations are integrated with coordination issues to produce a unique synthesis. The volume develops optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to handle relationships between governments and a conscious rational private sector and produces a unified, coherent approach to the subject. This book will be of interest to students and teachers of open economy macroeconomics and to professional economists interested in using macroeconomic models to design policy.
650			_aBusiness & Economics
700			_aLevine, Paul
942			_cENGLISH
999			_c616704 _d616704