000			01666nam a2200193 a 4500
005			20260304120517.0
008			260227s2026##################000#0#eng##
020			_a9780521881029 _qhbk
041			_aeng
082	0	4	_a324.9 _bDUC
100			_aDuch, Raymond M.
245	1	0	_aThe Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results _c/ Raymond M. Duch, Randolph T. Stevenson
260			_bCambridge Univ Pr _c2008.
300			_a399p,; _c20 cm.
504			_aindex
520			_aThis book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts, and then test explanations for this variation derived from their theory. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period.
650			_a ‎ Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
942			_cREF
999			_c615910 _d615910