000			01377nam a2200169Ia 4500
005			20260225135611.0
008			260225s9999 xx 000 0 und d
020			_a9783631345740
082			_a338.740943 _bWOL
100			_aWolf, J. Benedict
245		0	_aThe Effects of Agency Problems on the Financial Behavior, Performance, and Efficiency of German Industrial Stock Corporations / _cWolf, J. Benedict
260			_bPeter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften, _c1999
300			_a456 pages
520			_aUsing a catalog of seven agency problem identifier variables such as block ownership and market segment traded in, 237 German industrial stock corporations are analyzed for the time period 1986-1992. Five sectors are also analyzed separately. Agency-problem related differences in financial behavior, performance, and cost efficiency are tested for using t-tests for mean differences and logistic regressions. The cost efficiency is estimated via stochastic maximum likelihood frontier functions. Manager-controlled firms prefer free cash flows as predicted. Owners favor debt and avoid new stock issues. Contrary to theory, manager-controlled companies do not show a poorer performance than owner-controlled firms. They do, however, operate more inefficiently than firms controlled by owners.
650			_aBusiness & Economics
942			_cENGLISH
999			_c615550 _d615550