01499nam a2200181Ia 450000500170000000800390001702000180005608200200007410000220009424501520011626000710026830000140033952007980035365000250115194200120117699900190118895201100120720260225135611.0260225s9999    xx          000 0 und d  a9783631345740  a338.740943bWOL  aWolf, J. Benedict 0aThe Effects of Agency Problems on the Financial Behavior, Performance, and Efficiency of German Industrial Stock Corporations / cWolf, J. Benedict  bPeter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften, c1999  a456 pages  aUsing a catalog of seven agency problem identifier variables such as block ownership and market segment traded in, 237 German industrial stock corporations are analyzed for the time period 1986-1992. Five sectors are also analyzed separately. Agency-problem related differences in financial behavior, performance, and cost efficiency are tested for using t-tests for mean differences and logistic regressions. The cost efficiency is estimated via stochastic maximum likelihood frontier functions. Manager-controlled firms prefer free cash flows as predicted. Owners favor debt and avoid new stock issues. Contrary to theory, manager-controlled companies do not show a poorer performance than owner-controlled firms. They do, however, operate more inefficiently than firms controlled by owners.  aBusiness & Economics  cENGLISH  c615550d615550  00104070aACLbACLc4Ad2026-02-25l0o338.740943 WOLp219611r2026-02-25 13:56:11w2026-02-25yENGLISH