01377nam a2200169Ia 4500 20260225135611.0 260225s9999 xx 000 0 und d 9783631345740 338.740943 WOL Wolf, J. Benedict The Effects of Agency Problems on the Financial Behavior, Performance, and Efficiency of German Industrial Stock Corporations / Wolf, J. Benedict Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften, 1999 456 pages Using a catalog of seven agency problem identifier variables such as block ownership and market segment traded in, 237 German industrial stock corporations are analyzed for the time period 1986-1992. Five sectors are also analyzed separately. Agency-problem related differences in financial behavior, performance, and cost efficiency are tested for using t-tests for mean differences and logistic regressions. The cost efficiency is estimated via stochastic maximum likelihood frontier functions. Manager-controlled firms prefer free cash flows as predicted. Owners favor debt and avoid new stock issues. Contrary to theory, manager-controlled companies do not show a poorer performance than owner-controlled firms. They do, however, operate more inefficiently than firms controlled by owners. Business & Economics ENGLISH 615550 615550 0 0 0 0 ACL ACL 4A 2026-02-25 0 338.740943 WOL 219611 2026-02-25 13:56:11 2026-02-25 ENGLISH