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The Effects of Agency Problems on the Financial Behavior, Performance, and Efficiency of German Industrial Stock Corporations / Wolf, J. Benedict
Publication details: Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften, 1999Description: 456 pagesISBN:- 9783631345740
- 338.740943 WOL
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| English Books | Anna Centenary Library 4TH FLOOR, A WING | 338.740943 WOL (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 219611 |
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| 338.74094 BAR Control of corporate Europe | 338.74094 LAN European corporate strategy : heading for 2000 | 338.74094 YHI The European Corporation / | 338.740943 WOL The Effects of Agency Problems on the Financial Behavior, Performance, and Efficiency of German Industrial Stock Corporations / | 338.7409438 MIC Corporate governance and finance in Poland and Russia | 338.740954 DAS Corporate restructuring : enhancing the shareholder value | 338.74097281 JOR Companies in peace processes |
Using a catalog of seven agency problem identifier variables such as block ownership and market segment traded in, 237 German industrial stock corporations are analyzed for the time period 1986-1992. Five sectors are also analyzed separately. Agency-problem related differences in financial behavior, performance, and cost efficiency are tested for using t-tests for mean differences and logistic regressions. The cost efficiency is estimated via stochastic maximum likelihood frontier functions. Manager-controlled firms prefer free cash flows as predicted. Owners favor debt and avoid new stock issues. Contrary to theory, manager-controlled companies do not show a poorer performance than owner-controlled firms. They do, however, operate more inefficiently than firms controlled by owners.
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