The Effects of Agency Problems on the Financial Behavior, Performance, and Efficiency of German Industrial Stock Corporations / Wolf, J. Benedict

By:

Wolf, J. Benedict

Publication details: Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften, 1999Description: 456 pagesISBN:

9783631345740

Subject(s):

Business & Economics

DDC classification:

338.740943 WOL

Summary: Using a catalog of seven agency problem identifier variables such as block ownership and market segment traded in, 237 German industrial stock corporations are analyzed for the time period 1986-1992. Five sectors are also analyzed separately. Agency-problem related differences in financial behavior, performance, and cost efficiency are tested for using t-tests for mean differences and logistic regressions. The cost efficiency is estimated via stochastic maximum likelihood frontier functions. Manager-controlled firms prefer free cash flows as predicted. Owners favor debt and avoid new stock issues. Contrary to theory, manager-controlled companies do not show a poorer performance than owner-controlled firms. They do, however, operate more inefficiently than firms controlled by owners.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Status	Barcode
English Books	Anna Centenary Library 4TH FLOOR, A WING	338.740943 WOL (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available	219611

Using a catalog of seven agency problem identifier variables such as block ownership and market segment traded in, 237 German industrial stock corporations are analyzed for the time period 1986-1992. Five sectors are also analyzed separately. Agency-problem related differences in financial behavior, performance, and cost efficiency are tested for using t-tests for mean differences and logistic regressions. The cost efficiency is estimated via stochastic maximum likelihood frontier functions. Manager-controlled firms prefer free cash flows as predicted. Owners favor debt and avoid new stock issues. Contrary to theory, manager-controlled companies do not show a poorer performance than owner-controlled firms. They do, however, operate more inefficiently than firms controlled by owners.

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The Effects of Agency Problems on the Financial Behavior, Performance, and Efficiency of German Industrial Stock Corporations / Wolf, J. Benedict

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