Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy Francesco Lippi

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Publication details: Aldershot, Hants ; Brookfield, Vt Edward Elgar 1999Description: viii, 162 p. ; 25 cmISBN:

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Current library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Anna Centenary Library	332.11 LIP (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available		359349

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Previous	332.11 HAL Central banking as global governance : constructing financial credibility	332.11 HAL Central banking as global governance : constructing financial credibility	332.11 LAV Central banking in the modern world : alternative perspectives	332.11 LIP Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy	332.11 MAI Political pressure, rhetoric and monetary policy : lessons for the European Central Bank	332.11 MAY Designing central banks	332.11 MOR The theory and practice of central banking, 1797-1913	Next

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