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Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy

Lippi, Francesco

Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy Francesco Lippi - Aldershot, Hants ; Brookfield, Vt Edward Elgar 1999 - viii, 162 p. ; 25 cm

ISBN: 9781858989150

Subjects--Topical Terms:
Banks and banking, Central -- European Union countries

Dewey Class. No.: 332.11 LIP

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Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy

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